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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
Nos. 16-1593 & 16-1595 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
JERMAINE COLEMAN, 
 
                     Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Nos. 2-13-cr-00356-001 & 2-15-cr-00543-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 18, 2017 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR. Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 25, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
In these consolidated appeals, Jermaine Coleman challenges two orders of the 
District Court related to his federal bank robbery indictments. First, Coleman argues that 
the District Court erred by dismissing his original indictment without prejudice after the 
Government violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. We will dismiss that 
claim for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Second, Coleman appeals the District Court’s 
order denying his motion to dismiss his second indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 
On that claim, we will affirm the order of the District Court.   
I  
 On March 19, 2013, Coleman was arrested by Pennsylvania law enforcement on 
bank robbery charges and parole violations. Coleman’s parole was revoked, he was 
recommitted to state custody for six months, and was to be detained pending disposition 
of the bank robbery charges. 
 While Coleman was in state custody, federal authorities adopted the bank robbery 
case for prosecution. Coleman was indicted by a federal grand jury on July 11, 2013, and 
a United States Magistrate Judge issued a warrant for his arrest. On July 17, 2013, the 
FBI faxed a copy of the arrest warrant to the state facility as a detainer against Coleman, 
and a week later the FBI took custody of him pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum. On August 21, 2014, nearly a year after he was taken into federal 
custody, Coleman pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery as charged in the 
indictment. 
3 
 
 After the plea hearing, Coleman was returned to federal custody at the Federal 
Detention Center (FDC) in Philadelphia to await sentencing. Due to overcrowding, 
Coleman was transferred on February 26, 2015 from the FDC to George W. Hill Prison, a 
Pennsylvania state facility that contracts to house federal prisoners. When Coleman 
arrived at George W. Hill, he was mistakenly identified as a state prisoner. Coleman 
alerted prison officials that he belonged in the federal wing, but they responded that 
“[t]here is nothing in our records that indicates you belong in federal custody or that you 
have a federal case.” App. 134. The state officials then transferred Coleman to the State 
Correctional Institution at Graterford on March 31, 2015 to meet with the Parole Board 
pursuant to the May 8, 2013 state detainer. Coleman remained at Graterford until April 
22, 2015, when the District Court issued a writ of habeas corpus ordering Coleman to be 
returned to federal custody. 
 After he was returned to the FDC in Philadelphia, Coleman filed a motion to 
dismiss the indictment against him for violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
Act (IADA). Specifically, Coleman invoked the IADA’s “anti-shuttling” provisions, 
which apply when a prisoner is sent from one state (the sending state) to another state 
(the receiving state) pursuant to a detainer. If that prisoner is returned to the sending state 
before “trial is had” for the charges described in the receiving state’s detainer, then “the 
court shall enter an order dismissing” those charges. 18 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2, art. IV(e). 
Courts typically dismiss such cases with prejudice. Id. But if the United States is the 
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offending receiving sovereign, then the charges can be dismissed with or without 
prejudice after certain enumerated statutory factors are considered. Id. § 9(1).  
 On November 5, 2015, the District Court entered an order dismissing Coleman’s 
bank robbery indictment without prejudice. The Court noted that Coleman was in United 
States custody pursuant to the July 17, 2013 detainer based on the untried bank robbery 
indictment. It concluded that an IADA “violation . . . occurred when Coleman was 
erroneously transferred back to state custody on February 26, 2015, prior to his 
sentencing.” App. 144. After applying the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. app. 2 § 9(1), the 
Court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. 
 On November 17, 2015, a federal grand jury re-indicted Coleman on the same 
three counts of bank robbery. Coleman filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment, 
claiming it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. On March 3, 2016, the District Court 
denied the motion to dismiss. Coleman appealed.  
II 
 Coleman first claims the District Court should have dismissed his indictment with 
prejudice following the IADA violation.1 We lack jurisdiction to address this claim 
because the law is well settled that a district court order dismissing an indictment without 
prejudice is not a final order. See Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956). 
Indeed, we have observed that “[e]very court of appeals that has considered the 
appealability of an order dismissing an indictment without prejudice has held such an 
                                                 
1The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
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order is not final and appealable under § 1291.” United States v. Kuper, 522 F.3d 302, 
303–04 (3d Cir. 2008) (listing cases). Furthermore, because an order dismissing the 
indictment without prejudice is reviewable on appeal following a subsequent conviction, 
it is not an appealable collateral order. See Parr, 351 U.S. at 519–20.  
 Coleman also challenges the District Court’s order denying his motion to dismiss 
the second indictment on double jeopardy grounds. We have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
this claim because “[p]retrial orders denying motions to dismiss an indictment on double 
jeopardy grounds are within the ‘collateral order’ exception to the final order 
requirement.” United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1261, 1265 (3d Cir. 1996). Our review of 
double jeopardy challenges is plenary. Id. According to Coleman, the District Court’s 
dismissal of the original indictment for IADA violations was the equivalent of an 
acquittal. We disagree. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “a verdict of acquittal could not be 
reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting a defendant twice in jeopardy, and 
thereby violating the Constitution.” Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1074 (2013) 
(alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)). For 
double jeopardy purposes, an acquittal “encompass[es] any ruling that the prosecution’s 
proof is insufficient.” Id. at 1074–75. Acquittals “stand apart from procedural rulings that 
may also terminate a case,” following which the Government may retry the case without 
violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1075. “Procedural dismissals include rulings 
on questions that ‘are unrelated to factual guilt or innocence,’ . . . including ‘a legal 
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judgment that a defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished’ because 
of some problem like an error with the indictment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 
437 U.S. 82, 98 & n.11 (1978)).   
The District Court’s order dismissing Coleman’s original indictment was not an 
acquittal. Its ruling did not hint that “the prosecution’s proof is insufficient,” id. at 1075, 
and did not discuss the merits of the prosecution’s bank robbery case. Rather, the ruling 
was procedural because it was “not related to factual guilt or innocence.” Scott, 437 U.S. 
at 92. As we have noted previously, an IADA violation has “little [to] no bearing on the 
prisoner’s guilt or innocence.” United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 590 (3d Cir. 
1980). Coleman’s first argument on this issue fails accordingly. 
Coleman next claims that any attempt to retry him would be unconstitutional 
because the District Court dismissed the original indictment after it accepted his guilty 
plea. He is incorrect. “It has long been settled . . . that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s 
general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government 
from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through 
direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to 
conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1998). And in the plea-bargain context, 
we have held that “where a defendant by his own motion causes the withdrawal of his 
guilty plea, he has waived his right not to be put in jeopardy a second time.” United 
States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1978). Therefore, the Government was not 
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prohibited from re-indicting Coleman after he succeeded in getting his original 
indictment set aside for the IADA violation.  
 Coleman attempts to distinguish his appeal from the cases just cited by noting that 
they involve “error in the proceedings leading up to conviction,” whereas his case 
involves a procedural error that occurred after his guilty plea had been accepted. Reply 
Br. 8. This is a distinction without a difference. Those cases make clear that what matters 
is not when the error occurred, but rather what kind of error was committed. Specifically, 
retrial is prohibited only where the error was the functional equivalent of an acquittal, 
rather than some procedural error unrelated to guilt. See Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1075. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that retrial following procedural reversal is 
“necessary in order to ensure the ‘sound administration of justice’” and to vindicate the 
“societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear.” Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38 
(quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)). 
 Finally, Coleman contends the District Court abused its discretion by not holding 
oral argument on this motion. However, under Eastern District of Pennsylvania local 
rules, oral argument on a pre-trial motion is discretionary. E.D. Pa. Local R. Crim. P. 
12.1 (explaining that a hearing may be held, “[i]f the Court determines that oral argument 
is necessary”). In fact, Coleman’s double jeopardy motion was particularly suited for 
submission without argument because, as he concedes, “it was a question of law not one 
of evidence.” Reply Br. 8; cf. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that the district court is required to hold evidentiary hearing only when there 
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are “issues of fact material to the resolution of the defendant’s . . . claim” (emphasis 
added)). Likewise, the District Court noted in its memorandum opinion that the “case 
presents a narrow question” and that “the facts . . . are not in dispute.” App. 297. And the 
record belies Coleman’s claim that the District Court ruled “without giving him the 
opportunity to fully put his position on the record.” Coleman Br. 30. To the contrary, 
Coleman discussed the merits of the motion in detail at an ex parte hearing, filed a 
motion explaining his position, and filed a memorandum responding to the Government’s 
position.  
*  *  * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.     
